Hello {{First name|Predictable Revenue community}},
This is an audience appreciation post. I am deeply grateful for everyone’s replies to my last newsletter about whether or not I should raise a round of financing for predictable.ai. If you missed it, you can catch up here first.
Two weeks ago I told you I was thinking about raising money for predictable.ai and asked what you'd do in my shoes.
Fifty one of you replied and some of them were longer than the newsletter itself. I am extremely grateful for your thoughts and generosity with your time. Thank you.
You wrote from every angle. Founders who've raised five rounds. Founders who've never raised a dollar. A former CTO of a company that grew to around $20 billion. A few people stuck in the exact same decision right now, one of whom had spent the whole previous day arguing with Claude about it.
I read every one. Most of them twice. Then I went quiet for a week because those replies murdered my inbox.
So here's an update, and then here's what you taught me.
The update: Predictable just crossed $5K in monthly recurring revenue. And I've decided not to raise. At least not right now.
The most common theme surprised me. The VC math I laid out is out of date. One founder who raised earlier this year said the old gold standard for SaaS, triple, triple, double, double, double, now gets you disqualified. Funds want companies going from zero to $100M in ARR in a year. And it's not cynicism. A fund that bets on anything smaller doesn't raise its next fund, so the partners are on a treadmill too.
His line stuck with me. It's treadmills all the way down. Raising doesn't replace the client treadmill. It adds a second one on top, with leverage. And a modest round is the worst version of my poker table analogy, because now you're on their clock and your stack is still short.
The second theme was what happens at the exit. A founder who's been through three venture-backed companies, including an IPO, walked me through liquidation preferences like a patient uncle. Each round gets paid back before founders and employees see anything. Stack enough rounds and a sale that sounds great leaves surprisingly little for the people who built the company.
Another founder told me his company is cash flow positive today, and the pref stack is so big his employees are unlikely to see a dime if they sell anytime soon. His words: going beyond seed was a mistake.
That same three-time founder made a point I hadn't considered at all. I said a raise would help me compete with companies that have raised hundreds of millions. He asked whether a modest round actually changes that. I'd still be outgunned. I'd just be outgunned on a clock.
The third theme wasn't really about whether to raise. It was about whose money. The former CTO wrote that happiness depends mostly on the people you spend your time with. His question was simple: whose money am I taking, what return am I committing to, and will that relationship make my life happier?
A lot of you came at it from the same angle. Raise from customers who love the product. Raise from a strategic partner who can put you in front of buyers before the ink dries. Raise from operators who've lived it, not 26 year-olds in vests with capital to deploy. Someone pointed me to TinySeed. Someone else mentioned revenue-based financing. A few of you used the word seedstrapping. Raise once, raise small, get to profitable, and never go back.
And not everyone told me to stay away. One founder said flat out, take the money. He raised a small round, says his investors mostly leave him alone, and that a guaranteed paycheck lets him switch off at night and be a better dad. Another said she bootstrapped too long and wishes she'd used a couple of big deals as proof to raise. I'm glad they wrote. It would be easy to only hear the half that agrees with me.
Then there was the reply I can't shake. One reader asked about Carb.io. Would more money have funded the product fixes we needed to keep customers? Or would it have let me keep pushing sales while I put those fixes off? His guess was the second one, because that's what investors would have pushed for.
I don’t have a good answer but I believe capital would have given me more time to fix the issues. I am also confident that I would have found a different way to screw it up.
Another reader, who found my email in his spam folder, was blunter. Wait until investors chase you, not the other way around. That one stung a bit. It's also fair.
So here's where I've landed.
I'm not raising right now. I'm going to push on growth between now and January, and I'll revisit then.
Part of that is practical. I'm flat-footed on raising. No deck, no pitch, and the stretch between US Thanksgiving and Christmas is about the worst time to try. I'd be doing it at the expense of the early users who are paying me to help them.
But part of it is something I didn't expect to feel. If I can survive another three or four months, I think I can probably do this without angel or venture money at all. That feels like the ideal path.
That Carb.io question is also why I don’t fully trust myself here. I’ve made this call before, and I didn’t make it well. So I’m treating this as something I’ll keep poking at, not something I’m done with.
What I can do is keep checking. Keep looking at the numbers, keep asking whether my reasons are actually reasons or just stories, and be honest with myself when the answer changes. January is the next hard checkpoint.
Before I go, I want to say thank you properly. It's a really special thing to open your inbox to over fifty in-depth emails from people who took time out of their week to help me think. Some of you shared things about your companies, your money, and your families that you didn't have to share. I don't take that lightly.
Two of you said this newsletter is like therapy. Turns out it goes both ways.
My turn to pass the mic back to you. The last time you made a big call like this, how did you handle it?
I’d love to hear from you. Replies are the best part of this newsletter and I respond to each one by hand, even if it takes me a little while.
Collin
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